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Introduction
The nature and causes of prejudice are a classic area of study for social psychologists 1 .
Somewhat inevitably, a competing and diverse set of theoretical perspectives on the phenomenon has been generated, ranging from those based on social-learning (TowlesSchwen and Fazio, 2001) , to personality dynamics (Adorno et al., 1950) , to socialcognition (cf. Fiske, 1998) , and especially, to theories based around social identity (see Capozza and Brown, 2000) . Hagendoorn et al. (2001; 154-165 ) provide a detailed overview of different sets of theories of prejudice, employing Simpson and Yinger"s (1985) trichotomy of the cultural, the individual, and the group. One powerful "group" approach, particularly appealing to social psychologists, is an understanding of prejudice based on a conflict of interests (Bobo, 1983) , especially group-conflict driven by competing economic interests (see Hardin, 1995) . This "realistic group-conflict" approach suggests that economic factors and hostility to minorities are often interconnected.
Racism, it holds, as well as discriminatory actions, even "hate-crimes", and ultimately genocide, are at least partially explicable by dire economic conditions or a collapse in the material well-being of large sections of a society.
1 The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for providing valuable comments upon an earlier draft of this paper.
"This is an electronic version of an article published in Patterns of Prejudice, Volume 39, Issue 1 March 2005, pages 60 -74. This article is available online at: http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a713722455&fulltext=713240928 2 Classic social-psychological research around inter-group hostility easily accommodates the realistic group-conflict approach. For example, Dollard (1938) documented the growth of prejudice towards German immigrants in a town in the US; initially there was little hostility towards them but as jobs grew scarce in the local woodenware plants, opinion changed so that the immigrants came to be spoken of in very derogatory ways.
Jacobs and Landau (1971) also report how the Chinese who joined the gold rush in nineteenth century California were described by their white mining rivals as "depraved, vicious … bloodthirsty and inhuman" (p. 71); the prejudice towards this group reemerged at the end of the American Civil War as demobilized soldiers sought employment in a time of depression. Sherif et al"s (1961) "robber"s cave" experiments, also provide strong evidence that intergroup hostility can be understood as a function of competition over scarce resources.
Political data supporting the economic (deprivation) hypothesis are also plentiful.
Analyses of some voting patterns have shown political support for authoritarian parties to be greatest in constituencies experiencing jumps in unemployment; in France for example, strong support for the Front National is found in the "rust belt" of the North East as well as in the less economically successful Mediterranean départements. were associated more strongly with considerations about Dutch identity than with perceptions of economic threat, (see Sniderman et al., 2004; 35) . In that study, it was thus suggested that social identity approaches to prejudice may offer a richer alternative to researchers than economic, or "realistic conflict" ones.
And yet it is the case that simple economic measures continue to act as explanatory variables with regard to variance in people"s attitudes towards, for example, immigrants and foreigners. In the section below, consistent differences between different socioeconomic groups among European societies found in the 2002/3 European Social Survey are highlighted. These differences in attitude measures are generally in line with those found in the studies cited in the "realistic-conflict" tradition, i.e. deprivation appears to increase out-group hostility. Yet intriguingly, the trend with regard to voting behaviour in recent years has run counter to the predicted "deprivation = racism" pattern: instead, on attitudes relating to immigrants, asylum-seekers and to a lesser degree, ethnic minorities. Respondents were also categorized into one of 12 income groups. By collapsing the twelve income groups into three larger ones, differences between the poor (n = 14,277), middling (n = 9,650) and well-off (n = 6,995) respondents on a number of items relating to minorities and immigrants could be assessed. appeared to be associated with lower incomes. For example, one item asked respondents whether they believed "their country was made a better or worse place to live by people coming to live here from other countries" (item D29); answers were placed anywhere on a scale from 0 (worse place to live) to 10 (better place to live). Excluding "Don"t knows", the mean score of respondents from the fifteen West European states was 4.90 (standard deviation of 2.19). However among the respondents coded as poor, middling and welloff, the mean scores respectively were 4.46, 4.99 and 5.32. A Scheffé post hoc statistical test indicated that these differences are significant at the 0.05 level.
A similar pattern is found when respondents were asked whether they believed that their country"s "cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live
[there] from other countries" (item D28). As above, answers were given on a scale from 0 (undermined) to 10 (enriched). The mean response of all of those from the fifteen states (excluding "Don"t knows") was 5.85 (and a standard deviation of 2.45). The mean responses of the three income groups, from poorest to wealthiest, respectively were 5.37, 6.08 and 6.45. Again a post hoc Scheffé test indicated that these differences were statistically significant. Furthermore, not only are poorer respondents on average less positive in their beliefs about immigrants, but the poor in less economically egalitarian countries are relatively more hostile than the poor in more economically egalitarian ones 3 , see figure 1 below. Countries have been recoded into one of two groups; more or less egalitarian. FIGURE 1 about here.
As figure 1 shows, not only is lower income associated with more hostility towards immigrants, but (and as should logically follow), this hostility is stronger where the consequences of being poor are more serious and therefore more likely to result in greater insecurity, and that is in more inegalitarian societies; see Wilkinson (1996) for a discussion of the psychosocial characteristics of more versus less equal societies.
Not only do income differences within countries correspond with differences in opinion towards immigrants but so too do differences in average national income between West European societies. as can be observed in figure 2.
FIGURE 2 about here
As figure 2 makes clear, the economic features of a country appear to be strongly associated with the attitudes of respondents from those countries, whereby wealthier and more egalitarian societies (and these factors also overlap since there are no poor and egalitarian countries among the fourteen states) have on average more positive attitudes towards immigrants. Some readers may be concerned about levels of measurements and the risk of ecological fallacies whereby survey data make assessments at the level of the individual while the comparisons in table 1 and figure 2 are at a national level; however the basic point being conveyed is that at whatever level one examines it, there is an association between lower income, and anti-immigrant attitudes.
The Paradox -Right-wing populism in contemporary West European societies
Despite the findings noted above, whereby greater affluence and equality were associated with more positive survey responses towards immigrants, the, at least superficial, paradox is that recent anti-immigrant political movements and parties have tended to appear almost precisely in those states that are wealthy and egalitarian. Betz (1994) proposed The paradox then is that while respondents and citizens from wealthier and more egalitarian countries report more positive attitudes towards minorities in general and immigrants specifically, nonetheless the successes of radical right-wing parties have been registered almost entirely (with the exception of France) among the wealthiest and more egalitarian European societies. How can such an apparent discrepancy be explained ?
Should attempts to explain patterns of prejudice and public sentiment at least partially by economic determinism be abandoned in the face of this kind of paradox?
Some simple explanations for the paradox
Of course, the thoughtful observer should consider some obvious alternative possibilities that might explain the apparent inconsistency between attitudes (as expressed in surveys)
and behaviour (as expressed in votes). Indeed, the expectation that people"s attitudes and behaviours are, in general, consonant with one another has been jettisoned by mainstream social psychology 5 . In the still more amorphous world of political attitudes and behaviour, even less consistency might be expected. It might be that a person"s vote is decided by factors other than those elicited in a survey. For example, it might be that people base their vote on a candidate"s characteristics rather than his/her expressed views or party polices. Or that in some poorer societies, even if people are troubled by what they perceive as "immigration problems", other issues and concerns are more salient or pressing in informing their electoral decision-making. Alternatively, it may be the case that the discrepancy between survey data and voting behaviour arises as a consequence of hypocrisy. Jackman and Muha (1984) for example, have proposed that while the picture of the better educated (and obviously education and income overlap quite heavily) US citizen that tends to emerge from survey responses is that she is more tolerant and less prejudiced than her less well-educated compatriots, this, they suggest, is simply a superficial and abstract adherence to a refined ideology, designed to make its holder look more fair-minded, rather than an expression of real views. Thus, this argument runs, we should be sceptical of accepting survey responses at face value. must not be forgotten that political success and failure rely to a great degree on "random" factors like timing and the supply-side of the system, e.g. the charisma, or lack of it, of party candidates at election time. Or with regards to timing; an analysis of Dutch political trends, say, in 1995, might have concluded that the Dutch system was perhaps uniquely insulated from the mass appeal of right-wing populism or anti-immigrant politics, but an observer in 2005 would be unlikely to reach the same conclusion.
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The dual impact of economic determinism: Unravelling the paradox However, despite the specific and unique domestic factors in each country, as well as taking on board all the qualifications and caveats noted above, it is still strange, indeed remarkable, that the right-wing populism of the last decade has been so chiefly a phenomenon of wealthy European states. It must be that the apparent inconsistency between public attitudes and political behaviour is at least partially a logical function of economic factors, rather than being an irrational by-product of an amorphous political system, a flawed methodology or a fickle public. Perhaps material prosperity can have both direct and indirect consequences on politics generally, and on attitudes towards immigrants specifically. But the apparent inconsistency in attitudes may arise because the effects of direct and indirect economic forces actually run counter to one another. The positive association between attitudes towards minorities and national income has already been noted above whereby people living in wealthier and more egalitarian West
European states had on average less hostile attitudes towards immigrants. However, it may also be the case that the state that is more egalitarian and wealthier may be more attractive to outsiders. That socio-economic structure may act as one specific pull factor for immigrants and refugees should not be seen as sinister. People seeking to move to another state, in so far as they have any discretion over the decision about that move, must inevitably be influenced by certain pull factors such as language(s) spoken, presence of compatriot communities, family contacts and transport links to the state. It also seems plausible that states perceived as wealthier and more egalitarian are also likely to be more attractive, since they offer more opportunities, greater social cohesion and social inclusion, easier access to services such as health and education, as well as lower [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] and immigrants per 1,000 population are presented (2001) 11.5 against 4.9 for the other ten states. The mean immigration figure for the RRWPs is 9.0 against 8.4 for the non-RRWPs. (The modest differences with regard to the immigration figures may be at least partly due to the varied means by which they are calculated, and indeed the Eurostat website warns that "the differences between countries in terms of data sources and definitions reduce the comparability of the [immigration] statistics". By contrast, asylum-seekers are by definition making formal applications to the state and the figures are therefore much more precise.)
Contradictory influences, differing fears
The analysis therefore suggests that the impact of economic influence is unlikely to be uni-directional. Rather greater economic well-being (whether through higher national income or more equally shared ones) is directly associated with a reduction in negative views towards minorities and new arrivals such as immigrants and refugees. However,
indirectly, an increase in wealth and equality is also one important factor in making that society more attractive to those seeking to leave their own. An increase (or perceived increase) in new arrivals to a society raises the concerns of at least a section of the indigenous population, and for some of them, this concern may be salient enough to alter their voting patterns, so they become more sympathetic to RRWP parties. One partial piece of supporting evidence for this interpretation can be obtained from the figures in [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] , a reasonable proxy estimate for relative differences in newcomers to the various states, for RRWPs is 11.5 against 4.9 for non-RRWPs. In other words, the difference in the directly influential demographic variable is, as one would predict, more extreme, than the difference in the indirectly influential economic variable; see figure 3 below for a presentation of the differences by ratio to one another.
FIGURE 3 about here
The differences between poorer, less egalitarian states, with lower proportions of newcomers and the wealthier, more egalitarian states should, according to this model, be visible not just in contrasting political dynamics but also in general public attitudes. The survey data from ESS provide some confirmatory evidence. Respondents were posed a number of directly economic questions, including one which asked whether "average wages and salaries are generally brought down by people coming to live and work here"
(item D18). Comparing the responses of those from non-RRWPs (i.e. poorer, less egalitarian states, with lower numbers proportionally of immigrants and asylum-seekers) versus those from RRWPs (i.e. wealthier, more egalitarian ones, with higher numbers of immigrants and asylum-seekers proportionally), a large difference is found whereby those from the non-RRWPs are more likely to agree; on a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 = agree strongly, the non-RRWP mean was 2.87 compared to an RRWP mean of 3.30, a difference statistically significant at below the 0.01 level using a t-test, t = 31.0. Thus it appears that to the typical respondent from a non-RRWP, new arrivals are more likely to be perceived as an economic concern. On the other hand when the contrast is made for the same two sets of respondents on a non-economic survey item such as "communities of people who have come to live here should be allowed to educate their children in their own separate schools", a different pattern emerges. The RRWP respondents are more likely to disagree with this statement, thus now looking less liberal than their non-RRWP counterparts; again on a scale of 1 to 5, the non-RRWP is 3.31 while the RRWP mean is 3.69, difference significant at below the 0.01 level using a t-test, t = 26.9. This suggests that for the RRWP respondents, new arrivals are perceived more as a concern of integration rather than as one of economics, hence the greater rejection of the idea that immigrant children should be separately educated. Or to put it more crudely, in poorer states, immigrants, for many, represent an economic threat/problem while in wealthier ones, they are perceived instead as a problem related to social integration. This might explain, for example, the phenomenon of right-wing populism in a country like the Netherlands; it is wealthy, egalitarian, and has relatively high numbers of immigrants and asylum-seekers. The rhetoric of the right there has focused less on economic issues and more on "normen en waarden" -norms and values -and the perception that new migrants, as well as some Dutch ethnic minorities, are not integrating or subscribing to Dutch values.
Concluding Summary
Evidence has been produced to highlight a potential, or perhaps superficial, contradiction whereby although greater wealth appeared to be associated with less hostile attitudes towards minorities such as immigrants, it also was clear that most of the recent successes in right-wing populist political movements were emerging from societies where the average citizen appeared to endure relatively little economic hardship. An explanation based on dual influence was offered for this pattern whereby wealth can alleviate some feelings of threat about minorities while also, at the same time, increase the attractiveness of a society to greater numbers of incomers (in turn, indirectly raising the perceived threat). However, the qualitative nature of this concern changes in wealthier societies so that it is less to do with economics and more to do with integration. The political scientist
Ronald Inglehart has noted that this kind of phenomenon can be observed in a broad range of contexts. Labelling the principle, the "diminishing marginal utility of economic determinism", he argued that "economic factors tend to play a decisive role under conditions of economic scarcity; but as scarcity diminishes, other factors shape society to an increasing degree " (1987; 1289) . In wealthier European states, immigrants are less likely to be perceived as an economic threat, but non-economic concerns about issues of integration come to the fore as greater numbers of new migrants are attracted to these states. The position of the analysis presented in this paper is not that "economics don"t matter" but that economic security has bi-directional (competing) influences in setting the context in which anti-immigrant politics develop. 
